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1. Introduction
In	the	midst	of	everyday	social	life,	we	have	little	difficulty	identifying	
who	has	power	and	who	does	not.	And	yet,	power	is	one	of	the	most	
contested	concepts	in	social	and	political	theory.	The	literature	on	the	
concept	 “is	marked	by	deep,	widespread,	 and	 seemingly	 intractable	
disagreements	over	how	the	term	power	should	be	understood”,	Amy	
Allen	(2016)	points	out.1	Indeed,	the	disagreements	are	not	just	about	
our	understanding	of	the	term	but	also	about	the	nature	of	power	it-
self.	Is	power	something	that	individuals	possess,	or	does	it	circulate	
in	complex	social	networks?	Does	it	necessarily	involve	conflict	and	
domination,	or	is	it	a	social	ability	based	on	cooperative	relationships?	
Does	it	essentially	limit,	repress,	or	constrain	agents,	or	can	it	help	cre-
ate	and	shape	spaces	of	action?	While	such	debates	touch	on	a	range	
of	 conceptual,	 epistemological,	 and	 sociological	 issues,	most	 funda-
mentally,	they	signal	the	lack	of	a	shared	understanding	of	the	ontol-
ogy	of	power:	What	kind	of	thing,	as	it	were,	is	power?	How	does	it	fit	
into	our	understanding	of	the	social	world?	
In	this	paper,	I	develop	a	novel	account	of	the	ontology	of	power.	
My	discussion	is	not	concerned	with	whether	power	really	exists	or	
whether	it	is	grounded	in	more	fundamental	properties	(see	Harp	&	
Khalifa	2017).	While	 the	account	appeals	 to	fiction,	 it	 is	not	an	anti-
realist	account.	I	assume	that	power	is	constituted	by	social	practices	
and	then	ask	about	its	“way	of	being”	(see	McDaniel	2009):	What	is	
it	for	an	agent	or	an	institution	to	be	powerful?	In	particular,	I	will	be	
concerned	with	the	distinctive	temporality	that	power	has	in	virtue	of	
being	 constituted	 by	 ongoing	 social	 relationships.	My	 central	 claim	
is	 that	 the	reproduction	of	power	 involves	fictional	expectations	ori-
ented	toward	an	open	future.	This	is,	I	argue,	a	crucial	implication	of	
power’s	 social	 constitution,	and	 I	elaborate	 it	 in	 this	paper	with	 the	
hope	that	this	will	help	us	make	sense	of	some	of	the	deep	disagree-
ments	about	power.	
If	 power	 is	 socially	 constituted,	we	need	 to	 look	at	 the	activities	
that	constitute	it	if	we	want	to	understand	its	way	of	being.	I	therefore	
1.	 See	Lukes	(2005)	and	Haugaard	(2010)	for	similar	assessments.
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order	necessary	for	power	by	representing	it	as	unified (3).	I	will	argue	
that	this	involves	a	form	of	misrecognition:	Individuals	act	as if	power	
existed	already,	 independently	of	 their	own	support,	and	yet	by	act-
ing	in	this	way,	they	help	to	constitute	power	(4).	I	then	analyze	the	
pragmatic	function	and	structure	of	Hobbes’s	myth	to	draw	attention	
to	the	performative	role	of	conceptions	of	power	(5).	In	the	final	two	
sections,	I	develop	several	implications	of	the	pretense	account	for	a	
general	ontology	of	power.	 I	apply	the	account	to	different	 forms	of	
power	than	the	ones	that	Hobbes	had	in	mind,	focusing	on	money	as	
a	form	of	power	(6).	Finally,	I	explore	how	fictional	expectations	show	
up	in	everyday	experiences	of	power	(7).	
2. Power’s Social Nature
Power	is	the	ability	of	an	agent	to	have	a	reliable	effect	on	other	agents’	
actions	or	their	dispositions	to	act.2	Power	in	this	sense	is	essentially	
social:	an	agent	has	this	ability	not	primarily	in	virtue	of	her	individ-
ual	physiological	or	psychological	features	but	in	virtue	of	her	social	
position.3	 It	will	be	helpful	to	think	of	this	in	terms	of	what	Thomas	
Wartenberg	 has	 called	 “social	 alignments”:	An	 agent	 can	 effectively	
exercise	power	only	to	the	extent	that	the	actions	of	other	agents	ap-
propriately	align	with	hers	(1990,	pp.	141–62).	For	example,	my	boss	
has	the	power	to	fire	me	only	 insofar	as	 the	actions	of	other	agents	
appropriately	align	with	her	actions,	 so	 that	 if	 she	fires	me,	 the	HR 
department	will	stop	paying	me,	the	guard	will	not	let	me	in	the	build-
ing,	the	IT	department	will	revoke	my	access	to	the	company	server,	
my	coworkers	will	stop	collaborating	with	me,	etc.	In	virtue	of	this	and	
other	social	alignments,	my	boss’s	actions	make	a	difference	to	my	ac-
tions,	directly	by	firing	me	or	indirectly	by	making	it	prudent	for	me	
2.	 This	definition	is	inspired	by	Foucault	(1983,	p.	220)	and	Luhmann	(2002,	p.	
39).	While	the	definition	is	framed	in	terms	of	power	over	others,	it	is	compat-
ible	with	understanding	power	as	the	power	to do	something;	see	Pansardi	
(2012).	
3.	 Accounts	of	power	that	emphasize	its	social	constitution	include,	for	exam-
ple,	Isaac	(1987),	Arendt	(1970),	and	Parsons	(1963).	See	also	Allen’s	(2016)	
discussion	of	what	she	calls	systemic	and	constitutive	approaches.	
take	what	may	seem	like	a	detour	to	explore	the	pragmatic	character	
of	power	ascriptions.	What	are	agents	doing when	they	ascribe	power	
to	someone	in	their	social	interactions?	Power	ascriptions,	I	argue,	in-
volve	fictional	expectations	oriented	toward	an	open	future.	They	are	
effectively	a	form	of	pretense:	When	we	treat	an	agent	as	powerful,	we	
act	as if that	agent	had	a	robust	capacity	to	make	a	difference	to	oth-
ers’	actions.	Our	social	interactions	are	premised	upon	an	ontology	of	
power	as	robust	and	stable,	even	though	social	reality	can	never	fully	
live	up	to	its	neat	logic.	But	at	the	same	time,	this	pretense	has	a	per-
formative	character	(in	J.	L.	Austin’s	sense)	—	that	is,	it	helps	create	and	
shape	social	reality.	By	engaging	in	the	pretense,	individuals	constitute	
and	reproduce	the	social	relations	that	ground	power.	Thus,	fictional	
expectations	are	built	into	power.
I	develop	this	pretense	account	of	power	by	drawing	on	Thomas	
Hobbes’s	myth	of	an	original	institution	of	power	in	Leviathan.	I	do	not	
aim	to	settle	interpretative	questions	about	Hobbes’s	text	but	use	one	
of	 its	central	 insights	as	a	starting	point	to	think	about	the	ontology	
of	power.	 In	Hobbes’s	myth,	 individuals	 empower	 the	 sovereign	by	
misrecognizing her	as	already	having	an	independent,	robust	capacity	
to	 implement	and	enforce	her	commands.	Developing	this	 idea	will	
help	us	 recognize	 the	central	 role	 that	fictional	expectations	play	 in	
the	reproduction	of	power.	In	addition,	the	mythical	form	of	Hobbes’s	
account	 is	 instructive.	 Since	 power	 requires	 ongoing	 social	 support	
and	 legitimation,	 the	 structure	 of	 power-legitimizing	 myths	 is	 cen-
tral	to	understanding	power’s	ontology.	By	attending	to	the	account’s	
mythical	structure,	we	will	recognize	that	conceptions	of	power	play	a	
performative	role	and	should	not	be	understood	as	literal	descriptions	
of	social	reality.	
The	paper	will	proceed	as	follows:	In	the	next	section,	I	identify	a	
tension	between	 conceiving	power	 as	 socially	 constituted	 and	 char-
acterizing	 it	 as	 a	 robust	 capacity	 to	 prevail	 in	 conflict	 (2).	 This	 ten-
sion	exemplifies	the	difficulties	of	formulating	a	coherent	ontology	of	
power.	I	then	turn	to	Hobbes’s	myth,	which	addresses	the	tension	with	
an	account	of	representation:	The	sovereign	creates	the	unified	social	
	 torsten	menge Fictional Expectations and the Ontology of Power
philosophers’	imprint	 –		3		–	 vol.	20,	no.	29	(november	2020)
which	conceives	power	as	 the	 “human	ability	 […]	 to	act	 in	 concert”	
(1970,	p.	44).	For	Arendt,	power	 is	based	on	 the	collective	ability	 to	
coordinate	actions	around	shared	values,	goals,	and	rules.	Consensual	
theories	have	been	criticized	for	failing	to	account	for	coercion,	exploi-
tation,	 and	manipulation	—	that	 is,	 for	power’s	 role	 in	 social	 conflict	
(see	 Lukes	 2005,	 pp.	 32–5).	 Consensual	 theories	would	 need	 to	 ex-
plain	how	social	cooperation	could	be	robust	enough	to	persist	in	the	
case	of	conflict,	and	it	is	not	clear	how	they	can	do	that.
Consider,	 for	 example,	 John	 Searle’s	 influential	 “collective	 accep-
tance”	account	of	power.	Searle	(2010)	holds	that	social	facts	are	cre-
ated	by	the	assignment	and	collective	acceptance	of	status	functions	to	
objects,	actions,	and	persons.	This	involves	the	assignment	of	“deontic	
powers”,	such	as	rights,	duties,	permissions,	etc.	For	example,	the	Pres-
ident	of	the	United	States	has	deontic	powers	to	direct	the	actions	of	
executive	agencies,	veto	acts	of	Congress,	command	the	armed	forces,	
etc.	Even	coercive	institutions	such	as	the	police	and	the	armed	forc-
es	are	“systems	of	deontologies”	in	this	sense	(pp.	88,	107,	142).6	The	
collective	acceptance	of	deontic	powers,	Searle	argues,	gives	agents	
desire-independent	reasons	for	action	(p.	167).	A	powerful	institution	
is	able	to	prevail	even	in	the	case	of	conflict	or	disagreement	because	
most	agents	are	committed	to	acting	in	accordance	with	the	directions	
given	 by	 those	 in	 power,	 even	when	 those	 directions	 conflict	 with	
some	of	their	own	interests	or	goals.	Thus,	while	“all	genuine	power	
comes	from	the	bottom	up”	(p.	165),	it	can	nonetheless	be	used	to	get	
agents	to	do	things	they	would	not	otherwise	do.
Searle’s	theory	resolves	the	tension	between	the	social	and	robust	
aspects	of	power	by	fiat;	it	simply	assumes	that	the	power	instituted	
by	 collective	 acceptance	will	 be	more	 or	 less	 robust.	 It	 passes	 over	
the	crucial	question	of	how	this	collective	acceptance	 is	maintained	
6.	 Searle	further	distinguishes	political	power	from	military	power,	police	pow-
er,	and	brute	physical	power	more	generally	(p.	164).	He	does	not	spell	out	
how	this	distinction	relates	to	the	claim	that	even	the	coercive	power	of	the	
police	and	armed	forces	is	based	on	deontic	powers;	see	Gran	(2012)	for	fur-
ther	discussion.
to	do	things	I	would	not	otherwise	do.	No	personal	skill	or	physical	
ability	is	sufficient	for	her	to	have	this	power.	It	is	power	in	this	sense	
that	social	and	political	scientists	are	generally	interested	in,	and	it	will	
be	the	focus	of	this	paper.
While	an	emphasis	on	the	social	bases	of	power	may	seem	uncon-
troversial,	it	appears	to	be	at	odds	with	the	robust	character	that	we	
usually	associate	with	power.	Power	is	generally	understood	as	a	ro-
bust	causal	capacity	to	affect	others’	actions	in	a	wide	range	of	cases,	
most	importantly	in	the	face	of	resistance	from	other	agents	(see	We-
ber	1978,	p.	53).4	It	would	be	odd	to	attribute	power	to	my	boss	if	she	
could	get	her	employees	to	act	on	her	directives	only	when	they	are	in	
a	generous	mood.	Having	a	robust	social	capacity	to	overcome	others’	
resistance	requires	a	more	or	less	stable	alignment	of	agents	who	are	
disposed	to	act	appropriately	in	a	wide	range	of	situations.	However,	
social	 alignments	 are	 not	 static;	 they	 involve	 ongoing	 relationships	
that	must	be	continuously	reproduced	(Wartenberg	1990,	pp.	163–82).	
Since	a	social	alignment	is	constituted	by	the	mutually	responsive	ac-
tions	of	the	aligned	agents,	its	reproduction	is	subject	to	continuous	
negotiation	and	struggle.	Thus,	a	dynamic	view	makes	power	 seem	
rather	precarious	or	at	least	“results	in	a	more	fluid	understanding	of	
the	nature	of	power”	(1990,	p.	173).5
This	 tension	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	contrast	between	consensual	and	
conflictual	theories	of	power	(see	Haugaard	2010;	Haugaard	&	Ryan	
2012).	Conflictual	 theories	conceive	power	as	a	 robust	 capacity	 that	
can	be	used	to	secure	compliance	from	other	agents	by	overcoming	or	
averting	their	opposition.	While	such	theories	usually	specify	concrete	
bases	of	power,	they	rarely	discuss	these	bases’	social	constitution.	In	
contrast,	consensual	theories	take	the	social	constitution	of	power	as	
their	starting	point.	One	prominent	example	is	Hannah	Arendt’s	view,	
4.	 For	a	systematic	discussion	of	the	claim	that	power	is	a	causal	capacity,	see	
Menge	(2018).
5.	 For	explicit	acknowledgments	of	power’s	precarious	character,	see	Douglass	
(2014),	Dumouchel	(1996,	p.	71),	Hindess	(1982,	p.	506),	Hayward	(2000,	p.	
170).
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environment	at	all,	at	least	“in	the	sense	that	human	beings	could	not,	
by	acting	differently,	alter	it”	(p.	168).	That	is	right	as	far	as	it	goes,	but	
power	is	objective	in	a	different	sense.	Whether	someone	has	power	is	
usually	independent	of	the	beliefs	or	actions	of	any	particular	involved	
individual.10	When	we	experience	power	in	our	social	interactions,	we	
experience	it	as	shaping	our	ability	to	act	in	ways	that	we	do	not	con-
trol. How	dynamic	 social	practices	can	create	 such	objective	 facts	 is	
one	of	the	central	questions	of	social	ontology	(Thomasson	2003,	pp.	
269–70).	
An	adequate	ontology	of	power	needs	to	reconcile	power’s	dynamic	
nature	with	our	experience	of	it	as	a	robust	capacity	to	prevail	in	social	
conflict. While	Wartenberg	recognizes	that	power	is	often	represented	
in	this	way,	he	suggests	that	this	is	based	on	a	mistaken	ontology	(p.	
180).	 In	contrast	 to	Wartenberg,	my	strategy	will	be	to	carefully	con-
sider	 the	pragmatic	 character	of	 representations	of	power	as	 robust,	
stable,	 and	 self-sufficient.	Rather	 than	 interpreting	 these	 representa-
tions	as	literal	descriptions	of	social	reality,	I	suggest	that	we	need	to	
attend	to	their	role	in	reproducing	power.	In	the	next	sections,	I	will	
develop	this	approach	by	exploring	the	Hobbesian	myth	of	an	original	
institution	of	power.
3. Hobbes’s Myth of Instituting Power 
If	power	is	constituted	by	ongoing	social	relationships,	we	need	to	un-
derstand	how	 these	 relationships	are	continuously	 reproduced.	The	
reproduction	of	power,	I	will	argue,	involves	fictional	expectations	ori-
ented	toward	an	open	future.	When	we	ascribe	power	to	an	agent	in	
social	 interaction,	we	act	as if	 that	agent	had	a	robust,	self-sufficient,	
and	stable	causal	capacity	to	affect	others.	While	social	reality	can	nev-
er	fully	live	up	to	this	representation	of	power,	it	is	nonetheless	cen-
tral	to	its	reproduction.	Agents	reproduce	power	by	pretending	that	it	
exists	as	a	robust,	stable	causal	capacity.	This	view	draws	inspiration	
10.	 In	Searle’s	 terms,	power	 is	epistemically	objective	but	ontologically	 subjec-
tive	(2010,	p.	17f.).	
in	the	case	of	conflict.7	If	the	creation	of	powerful	institutions	creates	
agent-independent	reasons	to	act,	why	would	individuals	accept	such	
an	 institution	 and,	 in	 particular,	 continue	 to	 accept	 it	when	 it	 exer-
cises	power	 in	ways	 that	 conflict	with	 the	 individuals’	 interests	 and	
goals?	While	Searle	suggests	that	many	social	institutions	“tend	to	be	
in	 everybody’s	 interest”	 (p.	 207),	 he	 concedes	 that	 this	 is	 not	 a	 per-
suasive	 response	 in	 the	 case	 of	 power,	which	 can	be	used	 to	 affect	
agents	even	when	it	is	not	in	their	interest.8	The	underlying	problem	is	
that	Searle	effectively	thinks	of	power	as	a	static	feature,	treating	ques-
tions	about	 the	maintenance	of	 this	capacity	as	 secondary.	 If	power	
is	constituted	by	ongoing	social	relationships	whose	reproduction	is	
necessarily	subject	to	continuous	struggle,	these	questions	are	central	
to	any	inquiry	about	the	nature	of	power	(see	Wartenberg	1990,	p	181).	
We	cannot	understand	what	it	is	to	have	power	without	addressing	its	
continuous	reproduction.	
In	 contrast	 to	 Searle,	 Wartenberg	 emphasizes	 power’s	 dynamic	
character,	but	he	does	not	explain	how	it	could	be	a	robust	ability	to	
prevail	 in	conflict.	Wartenberg	points	out	that	 if	power	can	be	main-
tained	only	by	the	continued	cooperation	of	aligned	agents,	dominant	
agents	need	 to	exercise	 their	power	 in	ways	 that	do	not	 jeopardize	
future	cooperation;	power	itself	is	thus	a	site	of	ongoing	struggle	and	
negotiation	(p.	172).	However,	even	if	that	is	right,	we	would	still	need	
to	explain	how	a	relatively	robust	social	capacity	could	emerge	from	
such	a	struggle	or,	at	least,	why	power	is	usually	experienced	in	this	
way.9	Wartenberg	does	not	provide	such	an	explanation.	 Indeed,	he	
urges	us	not	 to	 think	of	power	 as	 an	objective	 feature	of	 the	 social	
7.	 See	also	Balzer	(2002),	Gran	(2012),	Lukes	(2006),	Papineau	(2008),	Schmid	
(2009,	p.	47),	Sánchez-Cuenca	(2007).
8.	 Searle	has	clarified	that	acceptance	does	not	require	approval	and	can	involve	
“grudging	 acknowledgment,	 even	 the	 acknowledgment	 that	 one	 is	 simply	
helpless	 to	do	anything	about,	or	 reject,	 the	 institution	 in	which	one	finds	
oneself”	(p.	8).	What	would	need	more	exploration	is	how	mere	acknowledg-
ment	could	create	or	reproduce	an	institution	with	power	over	others.
9.	 Axel	Honneth	(1991,	pp.	156ff.	and	173ff.)	notes	a	similar	issue	when	discuss-
ing	Michel	Foucault’s	account	of	power.	
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a	different	perspective	and	consider	what	it	can	tell	us	about	the	repro-
duction	of	power.
Hobbes’s	institution	myth	calls	on	its	readers	to	imagine	how	pow-
er	would	be	created	in	a	situation	where	it	does	not	yet	exist.	We	may	
be	skeptical	 that	 such	an	origin	can	be	coherently	 imagined	or	 that	
doing	so	 is	useful	 for	a	general	account	of	power,	 issues	 to	which	 I	
will	return.13	But	if	we	could	imagine	it,	it	could	help	us	identify	what	
is	 needed	 to	 reproduce	power.	 In	 the	 “state	of	 nature”	 that	Hobbes	
imagines,	there	is,	by	hypothesis,	no	genuine	social	power.	Individuals	
in	this	state	can	rely	on	their	individual	capacities,	their	strength	and	
street	smarts,	as	it	were,	but	not	on	the	use	of	means	that	require	so-
cial	cooperation.	No	one	can	trust	anyone	else	to	act	their	part	within	
a	social	alignment.	While	an	 individual	 (or	sometimes	even	a	short-
term	alliance	of	individuals)	might	be	able	to	get	others	to	do	things	
in	isolated	cases,	no	agent	can	stabilize	the	conditions	of	their	superi-
ority	because	they	cannot	prevent	others	from	overpowering	them	if	
the	circumstances	change	even	slightly.14	To	create effective	and	robust 
power,	agents	need	to	persistently	align	their	actions,	which	requires	
that	agents	form	stable	expectations	of	how	others	will	act.	
must	be	robustly	complemented	by	an	account	of	how	the	effective	power	
commensurate	to	this	authority	might	be	achieved”	(p.	61f.).	
13.	 See	section	5	below.	My	discussion	does	not	assume	that	Hobbes is	pursuing	
a	 “story-based	approach”	 to	 justifying	political	authority,	 i.e.,	 trying	 to	give	
reasons	for	creating	political	authority	that	individuals	in	the	state	of	nature	
could	act	on	(Newey	2008,	p.	69–86).	Newey	argues	that	Hobbes’s	myth	is	
not	intended	as	a	literal	description,	since	political	authority	is	founded	on	“a	
collective	act	of	imagination”:	By	imagining	that	we	renounce	our	rights,	we	
really	renounce	our	rights	and	thus	authorize	the	sovereign	(p.	82).	I	agree	
but	will	emphasize	that	the	reproduction	of	power	requires	imagining	a	past	
in	which	 robust	 power	 has	 already	 been	 created.	 The	 origin	 story	 plays	 a	
central	 role,	but	 it	 should	not	be	understood	as	a	 literal	description	of	 the	
past.	My	broader	claim	in	this	paper	is	that	this	is	an	important	insight	into	
the	nature	of	power	more	generally:	Individuals	reproduce	power	by	acting	
as	if	it	were	already	a	robust	capacity	independently	of	their	own	actions.
14.	 Even	if	we	follow	Hobbes’s	own	definition	of	power	as	one’s	“present	means	
to	obtain	some	future	apparent	good”	(1996,	p.	62),	we	are	forced	to	conclude	
that	individuals	in	the	state	of	nature	are	relatively	powerless	(see	Read,	1991,	
p.	515).	
from	Thomas	Hobbes’s	mythical	story	about	the	institution	of	power	
in	Leviathan.
Hobbes’s	Leviathan is	an	attempt	to	justify	political	authority	—	that	
is,	a	right	to	rule.	Nevertheless,	Hobbes’s	justificatory	strategy	requires	
him	to	make	claims	about	the	nature	of	power	understood	as	the	effec-
tive	ability	to	make	a	difference	to	others’	actions.	Hobbes	holds	that	
the	possession	of	power	in	this	sense	is	a	necessary	condition	for	hav-
ing	a	legitimate	claim	to	political	authority:	The	sovereign	has	a	right	
to	rule	only	if	she	can	maintain	peace	and	thereby	protect	her	subjects	
(see	Hobbes	 1996,	 p.	 153).11	 Since	power	 requires	 social	 support,	 its	
reproduction	cannot	be	taken	for	granted,	as	Hobbes	recognizes.	He	
needs	to	explain	how	a	robust	disposition	to	comply	with	and	support	
the	sovereign	could	be	created	and	continuously	reproduced.	This	is	
crucial	not	just	for	Hobbes’s	institution	story	but	also	for	his	account	
of	creating	 the	commonwealth	by	conquest	 (“by	acquisition”,	 to	use	
Hobbes’s	own	term),	since	the	ability	to	reliably	force	others	into	sub-
mission	also	requires	the	cooperation	of	at	least	some	agents.	As	I	will	
elaborate	in	section	4	below,	we	cannot	understand	the	reproduction	
of	power	without	understanding	the	structure	of	claims	to	and	recog-
nitions	of	authority.	Social	power	is	generally	reproduced	by	myriad	
mundane	actions	in	which	individuals	misrecognize	authority	as	they	
negotiate	the	social	world.	Because	Hobbes	recognizes	a	deep	entan-
glement	of	claims	to	authority	and	the	reproduction	of	effective	power,	
his	discussion	is	instructive	for	my	purposes	here.	Many	Hobbes	com-
mentators	have	 focused	on	questions	 about	 the	 legitimacy	of	politi-
cal	authority	while	taking	the	constitution	of	power	more	or	less	for	
granted.12	In	contrast,	I	approach	Hobbes’s	story	in	the	Leviathan	from	
11.	 See	Hoekstra	(2004)	for	a	thorough	discussion	of	the	relationship	between	
the	sovereign’s	ability	to	provide	protection	and	her	de jure authority.	In	par-
ticular,	Hoekstra	 focuses	on	whether	Hobbes	believed	 that	 the	possession	
of	the	requisite	de facto	power	is	sufficient	for	legitimate	de jure	authority.	My	
argument	in	this	paper	does	not	require	taking	a	stand	on	this	issue.	
12.	 See	Field	 (2014,	p.	 62,	 fns.	 5,	 8).	 Field	 argues	 that	 this	 “juridical”	 approach	
to	Hobbes’s	political	 philosophy	 is	 incomplete	 since	 “[i]t	 is	not	 enough	 to	
defend	a	doctrine	of	the	authorized	power	of	the	sovereign;	such	a	doctrine	
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be	in	direct	control	of	the	actions	on	which	their	power	depends.16	But	
in	the	absence	of	direct	control,	how	can	there	be	“real	unity”?17 
In	Leviathan, Hobbes	answers	this	question	with	an	account	of	rep-
resentation:	The	multitude	— by	itself	a	mere	collection	of	individuals,	
each	of	whom	pursues	their	personal	 interest	— becomes	unified	by	
being	represented	as	unified.	He	conceives	of	the	sovereign	as	a	rep-
resentative	who	authoritatively	speaks	and	makes	decisions	on	behalf	
of	the	multitude.	As	a	person	with	a	single	will,	her	actions	on	behalf	
of	 the	multitude	are	unified,	 thereby	making the	multitude	a	unified	
person:
A	Multitude	 of	men,	 are	made	One	 Person,	 when	 they	
are	by	one	man,	or	one	Person,	Represented;	 so	 that	 it	
be	done	with	the	consent	of	every	one	of	that	Multitude	
in	 particular.	 For	 it	 is	 the	Unity	 of	 the	Representer,	 not	
the	Unity	of	the	Represented,	that	maketh	the	Person	One.	
And	it	is	the	Representer	that	beareth	the	Person,	and	but	
one	Person:	And	Unity,	cannot	otherwise	be	understood	
in	Multitude.	(1995,	p.	114,	emphasis	in	original)	
We	can	reformulate	this	suggestion	in	terms	of	power.	Power	requires	
a	robust,	unified	social	alignment.	When	the	actions	of	the	multitude’s	
members	are	 represented	as	 stably	aligned	—	that	 is,	unified	—	these	
actions	become	aligned,	or	so	the	claim	goes.	The	public	representa-
tion	of	power	thus	plays	a	constitutive	role	in	the	creation	of	power.
To	assess	 this	account,	we	first	need	 to	understand	how	Hobbes	
conceives	representation	and	the	related	notion	of	a	person.18	In	anal-
ogy	with	 an	 actor	 on	 the	 theater	 stage	 and	 their	 “persona”,	Hobbes	
understands	a	person	as	a	“Representer	of	speech	and	action”	(1995,	
p.	112).	Natural persons	speak	and	act	in	their	own	name.	A	defendant	
16.	 For	a	strikingly	similar	argument,	see	Latour	(1986,	p.	265).
17.	 Crignon	(2014,	64ff.)	argues	that	the	recognition	of	this	difficulty	led	Hobbes	
to	develop	the	account	of	representation	that	I	discuss	below.	
18.	 For	an	in-depth	discussion	of	Hobbes’s	account	of	representation,	see	Brito	
Vieira	(2009).
To	 align	my	 actions	with	 others’,	 I	 need	 assurance	 that	 they	will	
continue	to	act	in	ways	that	I	can	anticipate.	In	the	absence	of	some	
kind	of	pre-established	harmony,	the	formation	of	stable	expectations	
requires	 the	prospect	 that	 fundamental	behavioral	expectations	will	
be	enforced.	 For	Hobbes,	 the	 sovereign	 is	 supposed	 to	play	 this	 en-
forcement	function.	But	the	sovereign’s	enforcement	capacity	cannot	
be	based	on	the	individual	abilities	of	any	person	alone;	no	individual	
is	strong,	smart,	or	persuasive	enough	to	make	everyone	align	their	
actions.	The	sovereign’s	power	can	only	be	based	on	the	support	of	
other	 agents.	 In	 other	words,	 it	must	 be	 socially	 constituted.15	 Insti-
tuting	a	“common	power”	that	can	guarantee	social	order	by	making	
agents	align	their	actions	thus	already	requires	some	kind	of	social	or-
der.	This	is	a	tight	circle,	and	it	illustrates	the	difficulty	of	squaring	the	
conflictual	role	of	power	with	its	social	constitution.	Power	is	needed	
to	 ensure	 that,	 despite	 potentially	 conflicting	 interests,	 agents	 con-
tinue	to	align	their	actions	with	others’.	But	the	only	possible	kind	of	
power	seems	to	require	that	agents	put	at	least	some	of	their	conflicts	
aside	and	act	in	concert.	
Hobbes	suggests	that	the	creation	of	a “common	power”	requires	
that	individuals	act	as one;	the	social	alignment	has	to	be	“a	reall	Unitie	
of	them	all”	(1996,	p.	120).	To	create	this	unity,	he	argues,	individuals	
have	to	permanently	renounce	their	rights	to	govern	themselves	and	
authorize	the	sovereign	to	make	decisions	for	them.	The	demand	for	
real	unity	captures	the	need	for	a	robust	social	alignment	that	will	con-
tinue	to	hold,	even	in	conflict.	But	even	if	we	put	aside	the	question	of	
why	agents	would	renounce	their	rights,	such	unity	seems	impossible.	
As	David	Gauthier	has	pointed	out,	individuals	cannot	literally	transfer	
de facto	power	to	the	sovereign	(1969,	p.	165).	They	can	promise	to	sup-
port	the	sovereign	and	comply	with	her	commands,	but	they	always	
retain	the	ability	to	renounce	their	support.	Thus,	no	powerholder	can	
15.	 Field	(2014)	argues	that,	in	his	later	political	texts,	Hobbes	“takes	significant	
steps	 to	 correct	 his	 earlier	 texts’	 preoccupation	with	power	 as	 entitlement	
and	neglect	of	effective	power”	(p.	62).	In	particular,	Leviathan	“offers	a	new	
analysis	by	which	human	power	is	a	socially	constituted	and	potentially	shift-
ing	property”	(p.	70).
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multitude.20	While	 the	sovereign’s	actions	are	attributed	 to	 the	now-
unified	multitude	 (the	 “commonwealth”),	 the	commitments	 that	 the	
sovereign	undertakes	 are	 ultimately	 borne	 by	 individual	 human	be-
ings.	In	Hobbes’s	terms,	the	commonwealth	is	represented	by	the	sov-
ereign	“by	fiction”:	The	sovereign’s	actions	are	attributed	to	the	com-
monwealth,	but	the	latter	is	not	capable	of	taking	responsibility	for	its	
actions.	The	multitude	speaks	and	acts	in	a	unified	way,	and	as	such	
constitutes	power,	only	in	virtue	of	being	authoritatively	represented	
by	the	sovereign.
Hobbes’s	 story	 of	 an	 original	 institution	 of	 power	 illustrates	 the	
tension	of	characterizing	power	as	robust	and	yet	socially	constituted.	
Hobbes	addresses	this	tension	by	appealing	to	the	constitutive	effect	
of	representations	of	power:	Representing	the	sovereign	as	having	an	
already-existing,	 robust	 capacity	 helps	 bring	 about	 a	 unified	 social	
alignment	 that	 constitutes	 this	 capacity.	This	proposal	 suggests	 that	
our	conception	of	power	as	a	robust	capacity,	even	if	 it	 is	not	an	ad-
equate	account	of	power’s	ontology,	plays	a	central	role	in	reproducing	
power.	However,	it	also	raises	several	questions:	How	can	represent-
ing	the	multitude	as	unified	make	it	so?	What	precisely	is	the	nature	of	
the	resulting	social	alignment	and	the	capacity	that	it	grounds?	In	the	
following	sections,	I	address	these	questions	to	work	out	the	implica-
tions	of	Hobbes’s	account	for	a	general	ontology	of	power.
4. Empowerment Through Pretense 
Hobbes	suggests	that	representing	power	helps	to	create	power.	What	
exactly	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 power	 and	 the	 underlying	 social	 align-
ment	that	emerges?	Many	recent	commentators	have	concluded	from	
Hobbes’s	suggestion	that	the	sovereign	represents	the	commonwealth	
“by	fiction”	that	the	commonwealth	itself	(the	now-unified	multitude)	
would	be	a	fictional	entity.21	For	example,	Sean	Fleming	suggests	that	
20.	Runciman	(2010)	discusses	the	relationship	between	the	individuals	of	the	
multitude,	the	commonwealth,	and	the	sovereign	in	more	detail.
21.	 Fleming	 (2017)	 provides	 an	 overview,	 suggesting	 that	 “most	 scholars	 […]	
now	agree	that	Hobbes’s	state	is	a	person	by	fiction	[…]”	(p.	1).	
who	 represents	herself	 in	 court,	 for	 example,	 is	 a	natural	 person	 in	
this	sense.	Artificial persons	act	on	behalf	of	others;	their	speech	and	
actions	 are	 attributed	 to	 the	 person	 they	 represent.	 A	 lawyer	 repre-
senting	her	client,	for	example,	is	an	artificial	person.	Representation	
for	Hobbes	 is	 thus	a	 relationship	of	 accountability:	Natural	persons	
are	accountable	for	their	own	actions,	while	an	artificial	person	acts	
on	account	of	 those	 she	 represents.	To	 further	 characterize	 the	 rela-
tionship	between	artificial	persons	and	those	they	represent,	Hobbes	
introduces	 a	 second	 distinction:	 Artificial	 persons	 “truly”	 represent	
someone	when	they	are	authorized	by	the	represented	—	for	example,	
when	a	client	retains	a	lawyer.19	But	an	artificial	person	can	also	repre-
sent	an	entity	that	is	incapable	of	authorizing	a	representative	and	tak-
ing	responsibility	for	its	own	actions.	Inanimate	objects	such	as	hospi-
tals	and	bridges,	children,	“Fooles”,	and	even	purely	imaginary	things	
(a	“meer	Figment	of	the	brain”,	p.	113)	may	not	be	able	to	authorize	a	
representative,	but	their	representative	may	be	authorized	by	a	third	
party,	such	as	the	owner	of	a	hospital	or	the	parent	of	a	child.	If	the	
represented	cannot	truly	take	responsibility	for	their	representative’s	
actions,	Hobbes	suggests	that	the	representative	represents	them	not	
truly	but	“by	fiction”	(p.	111).	
With	these	distinctions	in	mind,	we	can	clarify	Hobbes’s	claim	about	
the	constitutive	effects	of	representations	of	power.	The	multitude	by	
itself	is	not	capable	of	concerted	action.	But	when	it	has	a	representa-
tive	who	speaks	and	acts	on	its	behalf,	we	can	say	that	the	multitude	
“speaks	and	acts”	in	a	unified	way	in	virtue	of	the	representative’s	ac-
tions.	The	sovereign	is	an	artificial	person	whose	actions	are	attributed	
to	 the	 collective	 she	 represents.	But	 the	multitude	 is	not	 capable	of	
authorizing	 this	 representative,	 since	 it	 lacks	 the	necessary	unity	 to	
act	on	its	own.	Thus,	the	sovereign	has	to	be	authorized	by	third	par-
ties,	which	are	presumably	the	individuals	who	together	make	up	the	
19.	 See	Fleming	(2017,	pp.	1–6)	for	further	discussion	of	Hobbes’s	notion	of	an	
artificial	 person	 and	 the	 disagreements	 in	 the	 literature	 about	 its	 precise	
meaning.	
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in	Hobbes’s	myth	 need	 to	 act as if	 the	 sovereign	were	 powerful	 by	
complying	with	her	orders	and	supporting	her	enforcement	actions	if	
necessary.	As	enough	individuals	engage	in	the	pretense,	their	actions	
collectively	constitute	a	social	alignment	 that	gives	 the	sovereign	ef-
fective	power.	Moreover,	once	a	stable	alignment	exists,	 individuals	
have	prudential	reasons	to	comply	with	the	sovereign’s	orders,	since	
the	sovereign	now	has	the	capacity	to	enforce	agreements	and	punish	
disobedience.	The	pretense	— acting	as	if	the	multitude	were	already	
unified	— helps	to	constitute	a	situation	in	which	individuals	have	suf-
ficient	reason	to	act	in	ways	that	produce	the	necessary	unity.	By	acting	
as	if	the	multitude	were	already	unified,	individuals	help	to	unify	it.
However,	this	operation	requires	a	form	of	misrepresentation,	the	
precise	 character	 of	 which	 we	 can	 unpack	 using	 Louis	 Althusser’s	
(1971)	 account	 of	 constitutive misrecognition.24	 Althusser’s	 classic	 ex-
ample	features	a	police	officer	who	calls	out	to	me	(“Hey,	you!”).	As	I	
turn	around	in	response,	I	misrecognize	myself	as	being	subject	to	the	
officer’s	authority.	I	act	as	if	I	am	already	bound	by	the	officer’s	author-
ity	to	call	on	me.	But	since	normative	authority	binds	us	only	in	virtue	
of	our	recognition	of	its	force,	it	is	only	by	repeatedly	responding	to	
such	authoritative	calls	 that	 I	come to be	bound	by	 it.	Althusser	uses	
this	example	to	illustrate	how	a	social	order	creates	obedient	subjects	
that	inhabit	the	social	roles	and	relationships	that	this	order	requires	
(1971,	p.	132).	At	the	same	time,	the	example	also	suggests	that	obedi-
ent	subjects	are	actively	involved	in	reproducing	the	social	order.	The	
police	could	not	maintain	it	without	a	sufficient	number	of	individuals	
who	comply	with	 its	 commands.	By	 responding	as	 if	 I	were	already,	
independently,	 the	obedient	 subject	 I	 am	called	on	as	being,	 I	help	
reproduce	the	social	order	that	gives	the	officer	effective	power	and	
authority.25	In	other	words,	I	misrecognize	the	source	of	the	officer’s	
24.	 The	discussion	below	draws	on	 the	 insightful	 interpretation	of	Althusser’s	
account	in	Kukla’s	(2000,	2002,	2002a)	work.
25.	 It	 gives	 the	 officer	 power	 and authority	 if	 having	 de facto	 power	 is	 central	
to	(though	maybe	not	sufficient	 for)	having	authority.	 In	the	act	of	 turning	
around,	I	help	constitute	the	social	order	underlying	the	officer’s	power	by	
complying,	 and	 I	 help	 constitute	 its	 authority	 by	 implicitly	 recognizing	 its	
“the	state,	like	a	figment	of	the	imagination,	ceases	to	exist	if	it	ceases	to	
be	represented”	(2017,	p.	14).	One	could	understand	this	to	mean	that	
the	multitude	is	merely	imagined	to	be	unified,	but	that	alone	would	
not	 adequately	 serve	Hobbes’s	 justificatory	 project.22	 Legitimate	 po-
litical	authority	requires	that	the	sovereign	has	the	requisite	ability	to	
provide	 protection.	 This	means	 that	 her	 commands	 need	 to	 be	 reli-
ably	implemented	and	enforced	by	the	multitude’s	concerted	actions.	
Indeed,	any	effective	power	requires	a	measure	of	real	social	unity,	or,	
in	less	grandiose	terms,	a	robust	social	alignment.	We	need	to	clarify	
the	nature	of	such	alignments	and	how	they	can	come	about	by	way	
of	representation.	Inspired	by	Hobbes’s	suggestion	that	this	represen-
tation	 is,	 in	 some	sense,	fictional,	 I	will	argue	 that	 the	 reproduction	
of	power	involves	misrepresentation	about	the	nature	and	source	of	
power.	
To	understand	how	representation	can	bring	about	unity,	we	should	
think	of	 the	multitude’s	unity	as	a	product	of	pretense	rather	than	a	
mere	“figment	of	 the	 imagination”.	Pretense	 is	embodied	 imagination, 
which	crucially	requires	acting as	if	something	were	the	case	(Picciuto	
&	Carruthers	2016,	p.	317).23	To	create	sovereign	power,	the	individuals	
22.	 Fleming	argues	that	Hobbes’s	commonwealth	is	a	“fictional	character”	which	
is	represented	by	the	sovereign,	similar	to	a	play’s	character,	which	is	repre-
sented	by	an	actor.	Robin	Douglass	(2014)	argues	that	it	is	the	covenant	that	
is	fictitious,	which	makes	the	commonwealth	“a	fictitious	body”:	Individuals	
think	of	themselves	as	having consented,	and	by	doing	so,	they	really	consent	
to	be	governed	by	the	sovereign.	Neither	Fleming	nor	Douglass	denies	that	
the	 (attributed)	actions	of	 the	fictitious	 commonwealth	are	backed	by	 real	
collective	action.	However,	 if	our	question	is	how	effective	power	 is	gener-
ated	and	reproduced	through	this	process,	we	need	to	better	understand	how	
“imagining”	can	generate	an	alignment	of	actions	and	what	implications	this	
has	for	the	nature	of	the	resulting	power.
23.	 Picciuto	and	Carruthers	suggest	that	pretending	requires	that	one	performs	
an	action	of	a	 certain	 sort	because	 one	 imagines	performing	an	action	of	a	
different	sort.	Imagination,	understood	as	a	mental	state,	is	necessary	though	
not	sufficient	 for	pretense.	As	will	become	clearer,	 the	pretense	account	of	
empowerment	developed	in	this	paper	does	not	require	a	specific	mental	act	
of	misrepresentation	or	 imagination.	I	can	act	as if money	had	stable	value	
even	though	I	know	that	money’s	value	 is	 likely	 to	fluctuate	(see	section	6	
below).
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the	 sovereign’s	 claim	 to	 authority	 precisely	 because	 this	 is	 required	
to	create	the	capacity	to	maintain	peace.	The	goal	of	this	paper	is	not	
to	determine	whether	Hobbes’s	myth	successfully	legitimates	his	call.	
We	can	learn	from	Hobbes	in	any	case	that	the	constitution	of	power	
requires	misrecognition.	 The	 power	 that	 emerges	 can	 be	 character-
ized	as	fictional,	not	in	the	sense	that	it	is	merely	imagined	but	rather	
because	it	persists	only	insofar	as	its	social	agents	constitute	it	by	mis-
recognizing	it	as	already	persisting	independently	of	their	own	actions.
Althusser’s	mundane	example	also	helps	us	 further	explicate	 the	
temporal	structure	of	empowerment.	Hobbes’s	myth	imagines	a	one-
time,	original	creation	of	power:	Robust,	stable	power	is	brought	into	
existence	in	a	single	moment. But,	as	we	saw,	this	would	require	that	
the	 individuals	who	create	power	pretend	 that	 it	already exists	 inde-
pendently.	Similarly,	in	Althusser’s	example,	the	police	officer	appears	
as	 a	 mythical	 figure	 with	 an	 already	 existing,	 independent	 author-
ity.	 The	 reproduction	 of	 power	 involves	 imagining	 a	 mythical	 past	
in	which	power	already	exists.	This	past	is	mythical	not	because	it	is	
merely	 imagined	(Althusser’s	officer	needs	 to	be	 in	an	authoritative	
and	powerful	social	position	to	make	me	turn	around)	but	because	it	
plays	a	legitimizing	and	constitutive	function.	It	is	by	acknowledging	
this	past	as	already	affecting	and	binding	them	that	individuals	repro-
duce	power.	
At	the	same	time,	the	reproduction	of	power	also	requires	a	particu-
lar	orientation	toward	the	future.26	Real	power	has	to	be	continuously	
reproduced	 by	 innumerable	 mundane	 acts	 of	 misrecognition,	 and	
each	of	these	acts	implies	a	certain	view	of	the	future.	Since	the	cre-
ation	of	power	does	not	involve	a	literal	transfer	of	personal	strength,	
social	disunity	always	remains	a	possibility.	Instances	of	disobedience	
or	dissent	would	call	into	question	the	powerholder’s	capacity	to	guar-
antee	 the	 social	 order’s	 continuation.	 If	 enough	 individuals	were	 to	
26.	See	Rouse	(2002,	p.	353).	Responding	to	Kukla’s	retrospective	account	of	the	
constitution	of	authority,	Rouse	argues	that	constituting	normative	authority	
also	requires	a	prospective	mythical	invocation:	“To	have	something	at	stake	
in	one’s	performances	is	for	it	to	matter	how	things	turn	out,	for	there	to	be	a	
difference	it	makes	to	what	is	subsequently	made	of	these	performances.”	
power	and	authority;	my	turning	around	does	not	simply	recognize	an	
already	existing	authority	but	helps	constitute	it.
Hobbes’s	 mythical	 account	 of	 empowerment	 has	 an	 analogous	
structure.	By	speaking	on	behalf	of	the	multitude,	the	sovereign	repre-
sents	herself	as	possessing	political	authority	—	that	is,	a	claim	to	her	
subjects’	compliance.	Moreover,	since	having	the	ability	to	protect	the	
peace	 is	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 political	 authority,	 the	 sovereign	
needs	to	portray	herself	as	having	the	effective power	necessary	to	en-
force	that	compliance.	As	individuals	comply	with	her	demands,	they	
act	as	if	they	were	already	bound	by	her	authority	and	vulnerable	to	
her	power.	And	yet,	the	sovereign	has	power	and,	consequently,	politi-
cal	authority	because	individuals	comply.	By	complying,	the	individu-
als	participate	 in	 the	social	alignment	 that	 is	 the	basis	 for	 the	sover-
eign’s	ability	to	provide	protection.	The	individuals	of	 the	multitude	
misrecognize	 themselves	 as	 already being	 vulnerable	 to	 sovereign	
power	since	it	is,	in	fact,	their	recognition	that	constitutes	this	power.	
In	other	words,	the	pre-political	individuals	in	Hobbes’s	myth	are	pre-
tending	 that	 the	 sovereign	already	has	political	power	even	 though	
she	has	it	only	because	they	pretend	as	such.
Althusser	is	offering	his	example	to	illustrate	the	ideological	repro-
duction	of	social	order.	As	I	turn	around,	I	help	to	reproduce	authority	
by	responding	as	if	I	am	already,	independently, the	obedient	subject	
that	is	being	called	upon.	The	social	order	and	its	authority	are	repre-
sented	as	a	given,	as	a	fixed	fact,	rather	than	the	dynamic	product	of	
contingent	human	actions	and	interests.	What	looks	like	a	description	
of	reality	is	actually	a	masked	demand,	made	by	a	representative	of	the	
social	order,	to	make	this	description	a	reality	by	acting	as	if	 it	were	
already	true	(see	Kukla	2002a,	p.	72). Althusser’s	analysis	helps	us	see	
that	 the	 reproduction	 of	 power	 involves	 the	misrepresentation	 and	
misrecognition	of	authority.	Unlike	Althusser,	Hobbes	is	not	just	trying	
to	understand	the	social	dynamics	of	claims	to	authority;	he	is	trying	
to	legitimize	a	particular	claim.	He	calls	on	his	readers	to	misrecognize	
claim	on	me.	See	my	discussion	of	the	entanglement	of	authority	and	de facto 
power	above.
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Social	reality	can	never	fully	live	up	to	the	images	that	power	needs	
to	project	of	itself.	That	is	particularly	clear	in	Hobbes’s	myth,	in	which	
the	sovereign	is	presented	as	capable	of	overwhelming	any	attempt	to	
challenge	her	power.	In	reality,	even	the	most	powerful	agents	are	in-
debted	to	others	for	support,	and	their	power	is	consequently	always	
limited	and	precarious.	But	this	gap	between	power’s	image	and	any	
realistic	description	of	it	is	not	a	defect	of	Hobbes’s	account	of	empow-
erment.	Rather,	it	reveals	an	important	insight	about	the	ontology	of	
power:	Power	can	exist	only	if	it	is	misrepresented.
5. The Pragmatic Structure of Hobbes’s Myth
I	have	distilled	two	important	insights	from	Hobbes’s	account	of	em-
powerment:	Reproducing	social	power	requires	representing	 it,	and,	
more	specifically,	it	involves	a	form	of	constitutive	misrecognition.	In	
this	section,	I	will	discuss	the	mythical	form	of	Hobbes’s	account.	One	
might	ask	how	a	mythical story	 could	provide	any	 insights	 into	 the	
ontology	of	 power.	To	 answer	 this	 question,	 I	will	 discuss	 the	prag-
matic	function	of	Hobbes’s	myth	and	consider	how	its	complex	struc-
ture	serves	 that	 function.	Drawing	on	Quill	R.	Kukla’s	 (published	as	
Rebecca	Kukla	 2002,	 2002a)	 argument	 of	 the	mythical	 legitimation	
of	authority,	I	argue	that	Hobbes’s	myth	calls	on	its	readers	to	make	
themselves	into	agents	that	are	bound	by	political	authority.	The	myth	
is	an	attempt	to	legitimize	authority	by	telling	a	story	about	its	origin.	
But	it	is	not	and	cannot	be	a	literally	true	story;	what	does	the	legiti-
mizing	is	the	telling	of	the	story.	Since	power	requires	ongoing	social	
support,	understanding	the	structure	of	power-legitimizing	myths	 is	
central	to	an	account	of	power’s	ontology.	In	particular,	 it	draws	our	
attention	to	the	performative	character	(in	J.	L.	Austin’s	sense)	of	con-
ceptions	of	power.	
Myths	are	told	to	make	sense	of	the	present,	and	Hobbes’s	institu-
tion	myth	specifically	is	told	to	legitimize	political	authority	by	telling	
a	story	about	its	origin	(see	Kukla	2000,	p.	165).	To	understand	how	
a	coherent	chronological	account	of	the	origin	of	authority,	or	what	Newey	
(2008,	pp.	69–86)	has	called	a	story-based	justification.
judge	 that	 it	will	not	 continue,	 the	 social	 alignment	would	collapse.	
Thus,	 social	 reality	 can	never	 fully	 live	up	 to	 an	 image	of	power	 as	
independently	robust	and	stable	over	 time.	Acting	as	 if	power	were	
robust	and	independently	stable	requires	disregarding	these	possibili-
ties,	at	least	in	practice.	Ascribing	power	thus	involves	an	imaginative	
projection	 into	 the	 future:	a	projection	because	a	unified	alignment	
has	to	persist	into	the	future	for	power	to	exist	at	all	and	imaginative	
because	the	ascription	has	to	disregard	the	real	possibility	of	collapse.	
Maintaining	the	pretense	of	a	robust	and	stable	social	alignment	in	
light	of	the	possibility	of	collapse	requires	an	ongoing	and	socially	dis-
tributed	effort.	Representations	of	power,	and	the	dispositions	to	give	
them	proper	uptake,	have	to	be	continuously	reproduced,	for	example	
through	 signs	 and	 symbolic	 practices	 (uniforms,	 documents,	 titles,	
etc.),	educational	institutions	that	inculcate	habits	of	obedience,	spec-
tacles	of	violence,	etc.27	The	sovereign	needs	to	rely	on	other	agents	
acting	on	her	 behalf,	 and	 yet	 she	has	 to	 prevent	 the	 appearance	of	
depending	on	them.	It	is	not	a	surprise,	then,	that	Hobbes	has	shown	
considerable	interest	in	the	representations	of	power,	their	appropri-
ate	use,	their	possibilities,	and	their	dangers.28	But	it	is	beyond	this	pa-
per’s	scope	to	discuss	under	what	conditions	such	practices	succeed	or	
fail.29	I	only	defend	here	the	claim	that misrepresentations	are	required	
for	the	reproduction	of	power.	
27.	 See	Brito	Viera	(2009),	Latour	(1986).	Bejan	(2010)	discusses	Hobbes’s	view	
of	education,	arguing	that	the	goal	of	civic	education	for	Hobbes	was	confor-
mity	to	the	doctrine	of	 the	Leviathan — in	particular,	 to	 its	claims	about	the	
“mutual	relation	between	protection	and	obedience”.	For	a	discussion	of	the	
role	that	spectacles	of	violence	play	in	constituting	power,	see	Menge	(2019).
28.	For	an	extensive	discussion,	see	Brito	Vieira	(2009,	p.	118ff.).
29.	 I	am	not	offering	the	pretense	account	as	a	solution	to	the	collective	action	
problems	in	the	state	of	nature	that	have	been	discussed	extensively	in	the	
literature	(see	Eggers	2011;	Newey	2008,	pp.	69–83).	Since	pretense	involves	
action,	it	would	be	rational	for	individuals	to	adopt	this	stance	only	if	they	
have	the	assurance	that	others	will	also	adopt	it.	Without	explaining	why	it	
would	be	rational	for	individuals	to	adopt	this	pretense,	the	pretense	account	
does	not	provide	a	satisfying	way	out	of	 the	state	of	nature.	 I	argue	 in	sec-
tion	5	below	that	the	legitimizing	function	of	Hobbes’s	myth	does	not	require	
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This	means	that	they	have	to	inhabit	two	seemingly	incompatible	per-
spectives,	one	that	takes	power	to	be	a	product	of	their	own	creation	
and	one	that	takes	it	to	exist	independently	of	their	actions.	As	Noel	
Malcolm	(2002)	has	put	it:	
[…]	although	Hobbes’s	 theory	 instructs	 the	people	 that	
the	 sovereign	 is	 merely	 an	 artificial	 person,	 represent-
ing	the	collective	identity	of	which	they	are	the	real	con-
stituents,	at	the	same	time	it	requires	them	to	believe	in	
the	‘person’	of	the	commonwealth	as	something	outside	
them	and	greater	than	any	of	them.	(p.	228)	
Since	power	is	not	self-sufficient,	it	needs	to	be	instituted	through	col-
lective	action.	Each	individual	has	to	take	responsibility	for	doing	their	
part,	 which	makes	 it	 pragmatically	 necessary	 to	 emphasize	 the	 col-
lective	origin	of	power.	But	for	individuals	to	successfully	align	their	
actions,	they	have	to	imagine	power	as	something	that	already	exists	
independently	of	their	actions.	Neither	perspective	alone	is	sufficient	
to	make	sense	of	 the	reproduction	of	power,	and	yet	they	do	not	fit	
together	coherently.
We	can	make	sense	of	this	tension	by	attending	to	the	pragmatic	
structure	of	the	myth	in	which	it	appears.	When	Hobbes’s	individuals	
treat	 power	 as	 a	 given,	 they	 are	 forgetting	 their	 constitutive	 role	 in	
creating	it.	But	Hobbes’s	readers	need	not	do	the	same.	His	account	of	
representation	helps	us	see	that	the	image	that	these	individuals	have	
of	power	is	not	supposed	to	be	a	literal	description	of	how	things	are.	
Rather,	it	 is	shown	to	play	a	performative	role:	Hobbes’s	individuals	
institute	power	by	misrecognizing	it	as	already	existing.	Hobbes	does	
not	 fully	 dispense	with	 the	 idea	 that	 power	 is	 self-sufficient;	 rather,	
he	 subsumes	 it	 in	 his	 own	 origin	myth	 to	 emphasize	 its	 performa-
tive	role	(see	Kukla	2000,	p.	198).	This	insight	allows	us	to	reevaluate	
the	disagreement	between	consensual	and	conflictual	theories	that	I	
discussed	earlier.	Consider	first	conflictual	theories,	which	character-
ize	power	as	a	robust	capacity	that	can	be	used	to	prevail	in	conflict.	
Rather	than	treating	this	conception	of	power	as	a	literal	description	
his	origin	story	serves	this	role,	it	will	be	instructive	to	compare	it	to	
two	alternative	myths.	Hobbes	alludes	 to	 these	myths	 in	Leviathan’s 
dedication,	where	he	 suggests	 that	he	 is	 trying	 to	avoid	both	views	
“that	contend,	on	one	side	for	too	great	Liberty,	and	on	the	other	side	
for	too	much	Authority”	(Hobbes	1996,	p.	3).	The	former	locates	the	
source	of	power	 in	 the	consent	of	 the	people,	understood	as	a	 free-
standing	collective	entity,	while	the	latter	takes	it	to	be	based	on	divine	
ordination	(see	Skinner	1999,	p.	24).	I	will	first	consider	how	Hobbes	
responds	to	the	divine	ordination	myth	and	return	to	the	other	myth	
below.	The	divine	ordination	myth	suggests	 that	power	does	not	re-
quire	social	support,	since	it	has	an	extra-social	source.	But	the	point	
of	 telling	such	an	origin	story	 is	 to	give	subjects	 reasons	 for	compli-
ance.	The	telling	of	this	story	is	thus	an	implicit	acknowledgment	that	
power	depends	on	compliance.30	As	a	result,	the	myth	is	pragmatically	
incoherent:	It	calls	for	support,	and	yet	the	story	it	tells	to	legitimize	
this	demand	suggests	that	this	support	is	not	required.31
Hobbes’s	 legitimation	myth	 does	 not	 characterize	 power	 as	 self-
sufficient.	 Instead,	 it	 tells	 a	 story	of	 individuals	 creating	a	 “common	
power”	by	agreeing	to	obey	and	support	it,	thereby	recognizing	a	col-
lective	authority	to	hold	them	accountable	if	they	fail	to	play	their	part	
in	the	necessary	social	alignment.	This	myth	locates	the	origin	of	pow-
er	in	collective	social	action	rather	than	an	extra-social	origin.	But,	as	
we	have	seen,	there	is	a	twist	to	the	story:	Hobbes’s	mythical	individu-
als	cannot	institute	power	in	good	faith.	To	properly	align	their	actions,	
they	have	to	pretend that	a	power	that	can	reliably	affect	their	actions	
and	punish	disobedience	already	exists	independently	of	their	actions.	
30.	Moreover,	if	de facto	power	is	a	necessary	condition	for	legitimate	authority,	
this	also	implies	that	this	authority	depends	on	some	form	of	recognition—for	
example,	in	the	form	of	actively	participating	in	the	social	alignment	that	con-
stitutes	power.
31.	 Recognizing	this	pragmatic	incoherence	makes	sense	of	Hobbes’s	worry	that	
public	claims	about	the	divine	origin	of	political	power	cause	political	con-
flict.	If	individuals	forget	that	power	depends	on	compliance,	they	are	more	
likely	to	fail	to	do	their	part	in	constituting	a	stable	social	order.
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to	be	reminded	to	participate	in	its	reproduction,	and	yet	they	cannot	
see	this	participation	as	something	that	is	up	to	them.33 
Consent	thus	plays	a	very	specific	role	in	a	Hobbesian	account	of	
empowerment.	Hobbes	 suggests	 that	 consent	 is	necessary	 for	 legiti-
mate	 political	 authority,	 but	 he	 interprets	 any	 acceptance	 of	 protec-
tion	as	a	sign	of	consent,	even	if	 it	 is	under	the	threat	of	death	(see	
Hoekstra,	p.	58ff.).	That	is	a	thin	and	controversial	notion	of	consent,	
but	even	this	thin	kind	of	consent	contributes	to	the	reproduction	of	
power:	Agents	who	accept	protection	rather	than	choosing	death	help,	
through	 their	 forced	cooperation,	 reproduce	 the	power	of	 the	domi-
nant	agent.	Since,	for	Hobbes,	the	effective	capacity	to	provide	protec-
tion	and	peace	is	central	to	legitimate	political	authority,	a	call	on	indi-
viduals	to	cooperate	is	a	call	to	make	sovereign	power	legitimate.	But	
this	kind	of	consent	requires	that	those	who	are	cooperating	recognize	
themselves	as	already	vulnerable	to	someone’s	power;	consequently,	
it	cannot	be	an	original	source	of	power.	The	appeal	to	consent	is	thus	
not	in	the	first	place	a	literal	description	of	power’s	nature	but	instead	a	
demand	for	cooperation.	Consensual	theories	of	power	seem	to	iden-
tify	spontaneous,	unforced	consent	as	an	original	source	of	power.	De-
spite	important	differences	between	their	accounts,	both	Arendt	and	
Searle	hold	that	all	political	power,	even	if	it	involves	the	effective	use	
of	force,	originates	from	non-coercive	communicative	relationships	or	
acts.	But,	as	we	have	seen,	this	cannot	be	an	accurate	description	of	
how	power	is	reproduced.	Instead,	attention	to	the	complex	pragmatic	
structure	of	Hobbes’s	myth	suggests	that	appeals	to	consent	may	be	
playing	a	performative	role.	What	lends	plausibility	to	both	conflictual	
and	consensual	theories	is	that	they	appeal	to	conceptions	that	play	a	
central	role	in	the	reproduction	of	power.
This	 analysis	 supports	 a	 critical	 look	 at	 the	 ideological	 function	
of	consensual	conceptions	of	power.	Consider,	for	example,	Charles	
33.	 This	makes	sense	of	Hobbes’s	worry	that	claims	about	the	divine	origin	of	po-
litical	power	cause	political	conflict:	If	individuals	forget	that	power	depends	
on	 compliance,	 they	are	more	 likely	 to	 fail	 to	do	 their	part	 in	 constituting	
social	order.
of	social	reality,	we	can	recognize	that	it	plays	an	important	role	in	the	
social	 reproduction	of	power.	 Its	 reproduction	 requires	misrecogniz-
ing	power	as	a	robust,	static	feature,	even	if	real	power	can	never	fully	
live	up	to	this	conception.	
A	parallel	insight	emerges	for	consensual	theories	of	power.	If	we	
claim	 that	power	 is	 spontaneously	 created	 through	cooperation,	we	
treat	the	necessary	social	alignment	as	a	given	and	forget	the	role	that	
representations	of	 social	 unity	play	 in	 the	 alignment’s	 reproduction.	
The	continuous	reproduction	of	social	alignments	requires	that	agents	
are	 assured	 of	 continued	 cooperation.	 Thus,	 no	 chronologically	 co-
herent	story	can	locate	the	origin	of	power	in	a	spontaneous	event	of	
cooperation.	Whenever	we	try	to	imagine	such	an	origin,	we	realize	
that	 cooperation	 can	 happen	 only	 if	 individuals	 find	 themselves	 al-
ready	committed	to	align	their	actions.	Moreover,	even	if	an	original	
cooperative	event	could	be	coherently	imagined,	it	would	not	be	suf-
ficient	to	make	sense	of	the	reproduction	of	power,	since	it	requires	
that	the	cooperation	continues	into	the	future.	But	the	lack	of	a	coher-
ent	 chronological	 story	 is	not	a	flaw	 in	Hobbes’s	myth.	Rather	 than	
being	a	literal	description	of	power’s	origin,	 it	serves	its	 legitimizing	
function	by	calling	on	its	readers	to	participate	in	creating	the	social	
unity	 necessary	 for	 political	 power	 and	 authority.	 Hobbes	 believes	
that	individuals	can	align	their	actions	to	guarantee	peace	only	if	they	
see	 themselves	as	already	bound	 to	align	 them	 in	a	way	 that	 is	not	
ultimately	up	to	them.32	This	is	why	Hobbes	rejects	the	second	myth	
he	mentions	in	the	Leviathan’s	dedication,	the	idea	that	the	origin	of	
power	 is	 the	people,	understood	as	a	 freestanding	entity	with	an	 in-
dependent	capacity	to	form	a	will	and	act	(see	Skinner	1999,	pp.	24–7).	
Taking	social	unity	as	a	given,	 this	myth	 forgets	 that	unity	 is	 in	con-
stant	need	of	reproduction.	In	order	to	reproduce	power,	people	need	
32.	 This	way	of	interpreting	Leviathan	is	in	line	with	what	Kinch	Hoekstra	(2006)	
has	called	Hobbes’s	“doctrine	of	doctrines”,	which	holds	that	“subjects	cannot	
rightfully	publish	doctrines	contrary	to	those	laid	down	by	the	sovereign	as	
necessary	for	their	peace	and	defence”	(47).	
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explain	aspects	of	social	reality,	not	as	normative	demands.	But	they	
draw	on	everyday	experiences	and	conceptions,	and	we	should	not	
assume	that	the	pragmatic	role	that	these	everyday	conceptions	play	
is	that	of	literal	descriptions.	In	the	following	two	sections,	I	will	fur-
ther	develop	this	point	and	explore	how	everyday	power	ascriptions	
involve	fictional	expectations	that	help	constitute	power.	
6. Money as Power and the Articulative Effect of Fictions
The	 reproduction	of	power	 is	premised	upon	an	ontology	of	power	
as	robust,	stable,	and	self-sufficient.	Even	though	the	messy	reality	of	
social	life	can	never	fully	live	up	to	this	idea,	it	is	built	into	our	social	
practices.	While	this	may	seem	like	an	odd	conclusion,	it	is	already	fa-
miliar	to	us	from	the	ontology	of	money.	The	use	of	money	is	premised	
upon	an	ontology	of	intrinsically	stable	monetary	value,	even	though	
in	practice	the	value	of	money	is	always	precarious.	Drawing	on	the	
work	of	 the	economic	sociologists	 Jens	Beckert	 (2016)	and	Geoffrey	
Ingham	(2004,	2008),	I	argue	in	this	section	that	the	use	of	money	in-
volves	fictional	expectations	oriented	toward	an	open	future.	Money	is	
a	form	of	power;	it	gives	agents	an	ability	to	affect	the	actions	of	others.	
Specifically,	it	gives	its	holders	an	abstract	purchasing	power,	a	claim	
to	receive	goods	and	services	from	others.	Moreover,	the	reproduction	
of	stable	monetary	value	faces	the	same	problem	as	the	reproduction	
of	political	power:	It	involves	a	collective	capacity	that	can	be	and	of-
ten	is	appropriated	by	particular	interests	and	used	to	prevail	in	social	
conflict	(see	Ingham	2008,	p.	67),	raising	the	question	of	how	the	nec-
essary	collective	support	 is	reproduced.	Exploring	money’s	ontology	
will	allow	us	to	extend	the	pretense	account	of	empowerment	beyond	
the	centralized	form	of	power	that	Hobbes	had	 in	mind.	 It	will	also	
be	an	opportunity	 to	clarify	 further	 the	sense	 in	which	expectations	
involved	in	ascriptions	of	power	are	fictional.
The	proper	functioning	of	money	requires	a	“working	fiction	of	an	
invariant	monetary	standard”	(Mirowski	1991,	p.	580;	see	also	Ingham	
2004,	p.	84;	Beckert	2016,	pp.	105–9).	Money	can	function	as	a	medium	
of	exchange	and	a	store	of	value	only	if	we	can	expect	that	it	will	retain	
Mills’s	(2000,	2009)	criticism	of John	Rawls’s	contractarian	theory	of	
justice,	which	takes	as	its	starting	point	a	consensual	social	ontology	
of	society	as	a	“cooperative	venture	for	mutual	advantage”.	Mills	points	
out	that,	by	foregrounding	questions	about	fair	cooperation,	Rawls’s	
theory	 fails	 to	 explore	 the	 normative	 implications	 of	 white	 racial	
domination,	 conquest,	 and	violence,	 all	 of	which	have	been	 central	
to	the	making	of	 the	modern	world	(2009,	p.	173).	The	above	analy-
sis	 suggests	 that	 the	claim	about	society’s	cooperative	nature	masks	
a	demand	 to	 continue	 cooperating.	Moreover,	 since	 it	 characterizes	
this	cooperative	nature	as	a	fixed	fact,	the	consensual	social	ontology	
obscures	 the	 coercive	 sources	 of	 cooperation.	 It	 is	 an	 important	 in-
sight	of	the	social	contract	tradition	that	sociopolitical	institutions	are	
artificial	human	creations,	but	this	does	not	entail	that	their	origin	lies	
in	spontaneous	consent	(Mills	2000,	p.	447).	Any	real	cooperation	oc-
curs	in	the	context	of	pre-existing	social	and	material	conditions	that	
shape	how	 agents	 can	 act.	 Powerful	 social	 institutions	may	 expand	
society’s	collective	capacities,	but	they	are	often	appropriated	for	par-
ticular	interests	and	used	as	a	means	of	domination.	Because	consen-
sual	theories	such	as	Searle’s	take	a	static	approach	to	power	and	do	
not	concern	themselves	with	how	power	is	reproduced,	they	cannot	
explore	the	performative	and	ideological	roles	of	appeals	to	consent.	
Hobbes’s	 origin	myth	 is	 instructive	not	 because	 it	 could	help	 us	
locate	the	origin	of	power	but	because	it	draws	our	attention	to	a	dif-
ferent	pragmatic	role	of	conceptions	of	power.	Neither	the	appeal	to 
power	as	a	 robust	 capacity	 that	Hobbes’s	mythical	 individuals	must	
make	nor	Hobbes’s	own	appeal	 to	consent	should	be	 read	as	 literal	
descriptions	of	social	reality. Instead,	they	play	a	performative	role	in	
Hobbes’s	call	on	readers	to	reproduce	power	by	acting	as	if	it	already	
existed	 independently	 of	 their	 actions. Since	 power	 requires	 ongo-
ing	 social	 support	and	 legitimation,	 it	 should	not	be	 surprising	 that	
the	 structure	 of	 power-legitimizing	 myths	 is	 central	 to	 understand-
ing	 power.	With	 that	 in	mind,	we	 can	 reevaluate	 the	 apparent	 con-
flict	between	consensual	and	conflictual	theories	of	power.	On	their	
face,	these	theories	are	usually	formulated	as	attempts	to	describe	or	
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In	Kukla’s	words,	the	assumption	of	an	invariant	monetary	value	is	“a	
transcendental	condition	of	my	coherent	use	of	money”	(2002a,	p.	69).	
Because	 they	 have	 constitutive	 effects,	 idealized	 expectations	 of	
monetary	stability	need	not	necessarily	be	false	or	unjustified.	A	stable	
monetary	 future	 comes	 about	 if	 and	because	 enough	 agents	 act	 on	
these	expectations.	 If	banks	are	not	convinced	of	a	stable	economic	
future,	 they	are	 less	 likely	to	enter	 into	debt-contracts,	with	the	con-
sequence	 that	 economic	performance	will	 likely	 slow	down.	 In	 con-
trast,	if	people	are	convinced	that	the	value	of	money	is	stable,	they	are	
more	likely	to	engage	in	economic	interactions	that	will	help	keep	the	
value	of	money	stable.	That	means	 that	fictional	expectations	about	
money’s	future	value	are	not	necessarily	false.	They	often	become	true	
because	they	have	a	constitutive	effect	(Beckert	2016,	pp.	65,	72).34	By	
acting	on	the	assumption	of	stable	monetary	value,	say	by	granting	a	
loan	or	by	accepting	payment	in	the	form	of	money,	I	help	to	stabilize	
money’s	value.	Therefore,	we	should	understand	expectations	about	
stable	monetary	value	not	as	claims	about	already-determined	truths	
but	as	akin	to	performatives,	which	make	it	the	case	that	money	con-
tinues	to	have	value.	
The	point	of	characterizing	idealized	expectations	about	money	as	
fictional	is	not	to	make	their	truth	or	justification	an	issue	but	rather	
to	 draw	 attention	 to	 their	 role	 in	 articulating	 social	 possibilities.	 Jo-
seph	Rouse	(2015,	p.	300)	has	pointed	out	that	even	our	conception	
of	literary fictions	would	be	too	narrow	if	we	understood	them	merely	
as	representations	of	non-existent	situations.	The	primary	point	of	a	
fictional	work	like	Jane	Austen’s	Pride and Prejudice,	for	example, is	not	
to	represent	non-existing	persons.	Rather,	the	book’s	fictional	universe	
articulates a	set	of	character	traits	and	their	development.35	Focusing	on	
“three	or	four	families	in	a	country	village”,	Austen’s	novel	provides	a	
controlled	setting	in	which	the	complex	consequences	of	a	few	select-
ed	features	and	their	relations	can	be	elaborated.	Moreover,	because	
34.	 See	also	Kukla	(2002a,	p.	69,	fn.	2).	
35.	 The	example	is	Catherine	Elgin’s	(cited	in	Rouse	2015,	p.	303).
its	value	in	the	future.	The	value	need	not	be	strictly	invariant,	but	the	
devaluation	of	money	 through	 inflation	has	 to	be	 slow	and	predict-
able	 (Beckert	 2016,	p.	 106).	Older	monetary	 systems	 tried	 to	 secure	
this	expectation	by	tying	monetary	value	to	objects	presumed	to	have	
extra-social	 value,	 such	 as	 precious	metals.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 capitalist	
credit-money,	central	banks	bear	principal	responsibility	for	maintain-
ing	a	fixed	value.	Only	if	monetary	value	does	not	greatly	fluctuate	is	it	
possible	to	coordinate	supply	and	demand	in	large-scale,	impersonal	
markets.	Moreover,	long-term	debt	contracts	require	stable	money	be-
cause	this	gives	lenders	the	confidence	that	their	interest	is	not	eroded	
by	 inflation.	 Since	modern	 credit-money	 is	 created	 through	 the	 cre-
ation	of	private	and	public	debt,	 its	use	 is	based	on	the	assumption	
that	debts	will	be	repaid	in	the	future,	which	in	turn	is	based	on	expec-
tations	of	future	economic	performance	(Ingham	2008,	pp.	65–91).	Ac-
cepting	money	in	exchange	or	using	it	as	a	store	of	value	requires	act-
ing	on	the	assumption	that	a	particular	kind	of	future	will	come	to	be.	
The	 projection	 of	 future	monetary	 stability	 relies	 on	 an	 idealiza-
tion	that	disregards	possible	futures	in	which	money	fails	to	retain	its	
value.	The	monetary	future	is	uncertain	in	the	sense	that	actors	cannot	
fully	understand	all	 the	relevant	 factors	 influencing	the	 future	value	
of	money	 (Beckert	 2016,	 p.	 45).	 Even	 reasonable	 confidence	 in	 the	
stability	of	money	can	be	disappointed	in	unexpected	financial	crises.	
Moreover,	the	successful	maintenance	of	money’s	value	requires	the	
continuous	 efforts	 of	 central	 banks	 as	well	 as	 governments,	 private	
banks,	credit-rating	agencies,	etc.	(Ingham	2008,	p.	79).	But	since	we	
need	 to	 assume	 a	 future	 in	which	money	 retains	 its	 value	 to	 use	 it	
intelligibly,	the	possibility	that	these	efforts	fail,	as	they	sometimes	do,	
has	to	be	disregarded.	As	John	Beckert	puts	it:	“[…]	to	create	belief	in	
the	stability	of	money,	 its	 future	value	must	be	successfully	 feigned”	
(2016,	p.	108).	This	“feigning”	does	not	require	that	individuals	private-
ly	imagine	a	particular	future;	I	may	well	be	pondering	the	possibility	
of	a	severe	financial	crisis	as	I	use	money.	However,	for	my	use	of	it	to	
make	sense,	I	have	to	act	as	if	its	value	were	guaranteed	to	be	stable.	
	 torsten	menge Fictional Expectations and the Ontology of Power
philosophers’	imprint	 –		15		– vol.	20,	no.	29	(november	2020)
tions	are	directed	is	uncertain.	Empowerment	is	not	a	literal	transfer	
of	personal	 strength	or	other	 individual	 features.	 It	 depends	on	 the	
ongoing	willingness	of	aligned	agents	to	comply	with	the	directions	of	
the	powerholder,	or,	in	the	case	of	money,	to	honor	the	abstract	claim	
that	it	represents.	Since	an	alignment	of	actions	is	never	guaranteed	
to	persist,	it	is	always	possible	that	it	will	unravel.	In	treating	someone	
as	powerful	in	social	interaction,	I	have	to	practically	disregard	these	
potential	 futures.	 I	 have	 to	 abstract	 from	 the	 specific	 goals	 and	 atti-
tudes	of	many	aligned	agents	and	their	relationships	to	one	another,	
particularly	insofar	as	they	might	cause	conflict.37 
The	above	discussion	of	money’s	ontology	has	shown	that	the	pre-
tense	 account	does	not	 just	 apply	 to	 the	 centralized	 form	of	 power	
that	Hobbes	had	in	mind	but	also	applies	to	more	distributed	forms	of	
power.	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	develop	this	point	much	
further,	but	I	briefly	want	to	sketch	how	the	account	can	be	applied	
to	 disciplinary	 power.	Michel	 Foucault	 has	 explicitly	 contrasted	 his	
analysis	with	Hobbes’s:	“We	must	eschew	the	model	of	Leviathan	in	
the	study	of	power”	(1980,	p.	102).	In	particular,	he	has	challenged	the	
assumption	that	all	power	resides	in	a	central,	sovereign	position	and	
extends	outward.	Instead,	Foucault	draws	our	attention	to	how	power	
is	reproduced	in	all	social	relationships	and,	in	particular,	through	the	
bodies	of	individuals.	But	these	important	points	do	not	challenge	the	
main	point	 of	 the	pretense	 account.	Consider	 Foucault’s	 analysis	 of	
the	Panopticon	as	a	blueprint	of	disciplinary	power.	Its	design	ensures	
that	prisoners	cannot	see	when	they	are	being	observed,	so	that	they	
have	to	continuously	act	as if they	were.	It	thus	promises	a	continuous,	
automatic,	and	anonymous	functioning	of	power:	
incentives to	help	resolve	the	conflict	in	this	situation	and	defuse	the	dangers	
of	shortsightedness”	(p.	182,	emphasis	added).	
37.	 Hobbes’s	description	of	the	state	of	nature	makes	this	abstraction	seem	natu-
ral	by	emphasizing	 the	similarities	and	shared	 interests	of	 individuals.	But	
we	should	read	this	characterization	in	light	of	Hobbes’s	pragmatic	goal	of	
bringing	about	unity	by	(mis)representing	it.	Since	social	unity	is	not	given,	
individuals	need	to	abstract	from	the	possibility	of	conflict	in	order	to	collec-
tively	constitute	power	(see	also	Douglass	2014,	p.	142).
this	articulation	“draws	upon,	plays	with,	and	is	ultimately	accountable	
to	the	larger	material-discursive	setting	within	which	it	works”	(Rouse	
2015,	p.	300),	the	complex	domain	of	possibilities	that	it	articulates	can	
help	Austen’s	readers	understand	themselves,	their	actions,	and	their	
relationships	to	other	agents	in	new	ways.	
Similarly,	the	point	of	the	working	fiction	of	stable	money	is	not	to	
represent	a	non-existing	fact.	Rather,	it	helps	articulate	complex	ways	
in	which	social	agents	can	relate	their	present	and	future	actions	to	one	
another.	Money	is	an	abstract	and	transferable	claim;	it	abstracts	from	
the	concrete	material	features	of	goods	and	services	for	which	it	can	
be	exchanged	and	from	the	idiosyncrasies	of	particular	debtor-credit	
relations	(see	Ingham	2004,	p.	72).	This	abstraction	makes	it	possible	
to	use	money	 to	plan	 for	 the	 future	despite	uncertainty	of	what	we	
and	others	will	need	and	want;	in	Beckert’s	words,	it	“absorbs	uncer-
tainty,	buys	time,	and	calms	actors”	(2016,	p.	106).	The	expectation	of	
stable	monetary	value	allows	agents	to	engage	in	complex	multilateral	
exchanges	and	enter	long-term,	anonymous	debt	relations.	By	articu-
lating	complex	ways	in	which	agents	can	relate	their	own	actions	to	
others’	actions,	it	facilitates	social	relations	that	would	otherwise	not	
be	possible.	Of	course,	this	general	increase	in	“societal	infrastructural	
power”	does	not	affect	and	benefit	all	actors	in	the	same	way	(see	In-
gham	2008,	p.	67).	Struggles	over	how	money	is	concretely	instituted	
and	reproduced	are	thus	inevitable.	But	if	money	is	to	be	stable	at	all,	
this	requires	that	agents	act	as	if	it	were	already	valuable	on	its	own	
and	disregard	these	potential	conflicts	as	they	use	it.	
We	can	further	generalize	this	discussion	of	money	by	noting	that	
all	power	ascriptions	involve	an	expectation	of	stability	under	condi-
tions	of	uncertainty.	To	ascribe	power	to	an	agent	is	to	expect	that	they	
will	 continue	 to	be	able	 to	affect	others’	 actions	 in	 the	 future,	what-
ever	 else	may	 happen.36	 But	 the	 future	 toward	which	 such	 expecta-
36.	 In	 Hobbes’s	myth,	 individuals	 have	 to	 act	 as	 if	 everyone	will	 continue	 to	
support	 the	 sovereign	 if	 the	 need	 arises,	 even	 in	 cases	 of	 conflict	 or	 resis-
tance.	Hampton	(1986),	for	example,	emphasizes	the	role	of	future-oriented	
expectations:	 “[…]	 the	sovereign-elect	can	use	 the prospect of future selective 
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7. Pretense in Everyday Power Ascriptions
As	we	navigate	the	social	world,	we	frequently	experience	power	as	
something	that	exists	independently	of	our	own	attitudes	or	actions,	
something	 that	 can	negatively	affect	us	and	 is	 recalcitrant	 to	our	 re-
sistance.	We	might	be	able	to	criticize,	circumvent,	or	fight	it,	but	we	
still	must	navigate	it.	In	other	words,	ordinary	power	ascriptions	seem	
to	be	recognitions	of	existing	social	 facts.	 In	this	 last	section,	 I	want	
to	wrap	up	 the	 discussion	by	 showing	 that	 even	 the	most	 ordinary	
experiences	of	power	 involve	fictional	expectations	oriented	toward	
an	open	future.	As	an	example,	I	will	discuss	a	confrontation	with	a	
police	officer,	because	it	seems	to	involve	most	clearly	the	recognition	
of	power	as	a	robust	capacity	that	exists	completely	independently	of	
my	own	actions.	
Everyday	power	ascriptions,	which	are	often	implicit	in	how	we	act	
and	treat	others,	seem	to	be	mere	observations	of	social	facts.	When	
a	police	officer	 stops	me	and	demands	 identification,	 I	 am	 likely	 to	
comply	because	I	take	the	officer	to	have	power	over	me.	The	officer’s	
commands	might	 be	 immediately	 compelling,	 or	 the	 “force”	 of	 her	
commands	might	present	itself	by	way	of	potential	consequences	of	
disobeying:	arrest;	being	convicted	of	a	crime;	losing	my	job,	my	free-
dom,	my	social	standing,	my	ability	to	vote,	etc.	Even	if,	on	reflection,	
I	would	not	accept	as	legitimate	the	officer’s	claim	to	authority,	I	know	
that	I	am	unlikely	to	avoid	such	consequences	if	I	disobey.	I	have	to	act	
on	the	assumption	that	she	can	rely	on	others	to	support	her	actions	
and	implement	those	consequences.	Thus,	as	I	comply	with	her	orders,	
I	treat	power	as	something	that	exists	independently	of	my	own	atti-
tudes	or	actions.	My	ascription	of	power	seems	to	be	an	observation	of	
an	already	existing	social	fact.40 
However,	this	is	only	part	of	the	story.	For	one,	the	consequences	
of	non-compliance	do	not	obtain	automatically	but	have	to	be	actively	
40.	This	insight	is	echoed	by	Paolo	Freire’s	observation	that	people	who	are	op-
pressed	often	have	“a	diffuse,	magical	belief	in	the	invulnerability	and	power	
of	the	oppressor”	(1970,	p.	64).	My	above	argument	is	that	this	is	a	general	
feature	of	our	experience	of	power	to	which	we	are	subjected.
[…]	to	arrange	things	that	the	surveillance	is	permanent	
in	its	effects,	even	if	it	is	discontinuous	in	its	action;	that	
the	perfection	of	power	should	tend	to	render	its	actual	
exercise	 unnecessary;	 that	 this	 architectural	 apparatus	
should	be	a machine for creating and sustaining a power rela-
tion independent of the person who exercises it.	(Foucault	1977,	
p.	201,	emphasis	added)38 
But	the	image	of	a	“machine	of	power”	ascribes	a	unity	to	the	ar-
rangement	 to	which	no	 real	 practice	 can	 live	 up.39	Real-world	 disci-
plinary	 institutions	 need	 to	mobilize	 people	 and	 things	 to	 conduct	
surveillance,	document	performances,	and	carry	out	sanctions	for	de-
viations,	and	they	may	fail	to	align	them	properly.	Nonetheless,	those	
who	are	subject	to	these	practices	have	to	assume	that	deviations	will	
have	consequences,	an	assumption	that	is	built	into	the	Panopticon’s	
architecture.	Acting	on	this	assumption,	individuals	regulate	their	be-
havior,	 and	by	doing	 so,	 they	 add	 themselves	 to	 a	 social	 alignment	
that	constitutes	power.	As	Foucault	puts	this	point:	“The	prison	is	[…]	
a	machine	whose	convict-workers	are	both	the	cogs	and	the	products”	
(p.	242).	The	 image	of	a	machine	of	power	 is	built	 into	the	material	
structure	of	disciplinary	practices,	and	while	social	reality	can	never	
fully	 live	up	 to	 it,	 it	nonetheless	helps	 to	 constitute	power.	As	with	
money,	 disciplinary	power	does	not	 require	 a	 central	 position	 from	
which	all	power	is	exercised.	However,	it	is	premised	on	the	assump-
tion	that	social	institutions	will	have	reliable	effects	on	agents’	actions	
(and	their	dispositions	to	act),	even	though	it	is	only	by	acting	on	this	
assumption	that	this	power	is	constituted.
38.	For	further	references	to	this	image,	which	are	not	restricted	to	the	specific	
structure	of	 the	Panopticon,	 see,	 for	 example,	 pp.	 164,	 177,	 242.	By	 empha-
sizing	this	machine	metaphor,	Foucault	is	explicating	the	self-understanding	
that	organizes	disciplinary	practices,	not	using	the	machine	metaphor	him-
self.	He	 quotes	 a	 contemporary	who	 comments	 on	Bentham’s	 plans:	 “The	
English	reveal	their	genius	for	mechanics	in	everything	they	do	[…]	and	they	
want	their	buildings	to	function	as	a	machine	subject	to	the	action	of	a	single	
motor”	(endnote	13,	p.	319).
39.	See	Foucault’s	(1977)	discussion	of	the	“failure”	of	the	prison	(pp.	264–8).	
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undermines	the	support	from	other	agents.	It	is	always	an	open	ques-
tion	whether	 an	alignment	 is	 going	 to	hold	up	 in	 the	 future,	 and	 it	
cannot	hold	up	unless	enough	agents	continue	to	ascribe	power.	Thus,	
the	police’s	power	depends	on	the	disposition	of	many	agents	to	treat	
the	police	as	robustly	powerful.
Ordinary	power	ascriptions	can	 thus	not	be	understood	as	mere	
descriptions	of	social	reality.	Ascribing	power	to	an	agent	(or	failing	to	
do	so)	will	likely	make	a	difference	to	what	is	purportedly	described.	
That	 is	not	 to	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	easy	 to	undermine	power	by	simply	
refusing	to	ascribe	it.	The	potential	costs	of	a	challenge	usually	make	
compliance	the	prudent	response	for	subordinate	agents.	I	have	good	
reasons	to	ascribe	power	to	a	police	officer	and	treat	them	accordingly,	
even	though	I	cannot	rule	out	the	possibility	that	the	social	support	I	
presume	will	 not	materialize.	 Structures	of	 power	 can	 thus	become	
relatively	robust	even	though	they	depend	on	continuous	social	sup-
port.	Nonetheless,	any	ascription	of	power	involves	an	idealizing	as-
sumption:	It	assumes	that	the	necessary	social	alignments	will	persist,	
even	though	this	is	never	guaranteed.	Acting	on	this	idealization	has	
a	constitutive	effect:	By	complying	with	the	police	officer’s	demand	to	
identify	myself,	I	add	myself	to	the	social	alignment	that	is	the	basis	
of	her	power.	By	doing	what	I	am	told,	I	am	acting	in	concert	with	her.	
She	achieves	her	goal	without	mobilizing	aligned	agents	and	exposing	
her	presentation	as	powerful	to	a	crucial	test.41	Moreover,	my	compli-
ance	may	provide	others	with	evidence	of	her	power,	giving	them	a	
reason	to	comply	as	well.	Thus,	by	treating	someone	as	powerful,	I	am	
doing	more	than	simply	responding	to	already-existing	social	facts;	I	
act	on	an	idealized	account	of	the	future	and,	by	doing	so,	help	bring	
about	that	future.
It	is	not	an	objection	to	this	analysis	that	we	usually	have	good	evi-
dence	that	the	police	will	be	able	to	enforce	their	commands.	As	I	dis-
cussed	above,	the	point	of	characterizing	power	ascriptions	as	fictional	
41.	 It	 is	widely	 recognized	 that	 the	mere	 anticipation	 of	 power’s	 exercise	 can	
have	power	effects	—	see,	for	example,	Lukes	(2005,	pp.	45ff,	124),	Luhmann	
(2002,	pp.	46,	51–4).	
implemented	by	other	agents.	Suppose	I	disregard	the	officer’s	order,	
and	I	get	arrested	as	a	result.	I	could	challenge	the	arrest	in	court,	hop-
ing	that	I	will	be	able	to	convince	a	judge	that	the	demand	for	identi-
fication	was	illegitimate.	If	I	succeed,	it	will	have	turned	out	that	the	
officer	did	not	have	the	power	that	I	initially	assumed	she	had	(though	
she	still	had	some	power).	The	likelihood	of	such	an	outcome	depends	
on	the	circumstances.	The	point	here	is	simply	that	for	effects	of	power	
to	materialize,	the	powerholder	has	to	call	upon	a	network	of	social	
relationships	to	implement	these	effects.	Many	others,	such	as	other	
police	officers,	bystanders,	judges,	correction	officials,	employers,	etc.	
will	have	to	align	their	actions	continuously	to	bring	them	about.	It	is	
possible	—	though	often	unlikely	—	that	this	support	will	not	material-
ize.	In	treating	the	police	officer	as	powerful,	I	disregard	these	possi-
ble	futures.	In	that	sense,	ordinary	power	ascriptions	involve	fictional	
expectations.
In	addition,	my	actions	are	likely	to	affect	how	others	will	act	and	
thereby	can	affect	the	bases	of	the	officer’s	power.	Social	alignments	
are	precarious;	they	must	be	continuously	reconstituted	by	the	ongo-
ing	activities	of	the	aligned	agents.	If	I	do	not	comply	with	the	officer’s	
demand,	 I	effectively	challenge	her	and	 the	police’s	public	presenta-
tion	as	powerful.	 If	 the	officer	or	 the	police	 fail	 to	answer	 this	 chal-
lenge,	this	may	give	others	reason	to	engage	in	similar	challenges.	An	
active	 response	 is	 required	 to	affirm	 the	continuing	effectiveness	of	
the	police’s	power.	But	such	a	response	would	require	the	police	force	
to	shift	its	plans	to	an	effort	to	publicly	prove	its	enforcement	power	
because	it	cannot	rely	anymore	on	the	presumption	that	it	has	effec-
tive	power.	If	enough	individuals	refuse	to	show	an	ID,	for	example,	
the	 police may	 soon	 be	 overwhelmed	 by	 trying	 to	 enforce	 this	 de-
mand.	Sometimes,	whole	regimes	collapse	more	or	less	overnight	be-
cause	they	appear	weak	and,	as	a	result,	lose	the	necessary	social	sup-
port.	In	light	of	the	possibility	that	alignments	collapse,	powerholders	
have	good	reason	to	signal	that	they	are	willing	to	make	challenges	
very	costly	for	subjects	(see	Luhmann	2002,	pp.	46–7).	But	even	such	
threats	 are	 risky;	 their	 enforcement	may	 fail	 or	 be	 so	 severe	 that	 it	
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the	 constitutive	 effects	 of	misrepresenting	 power	 as	 a	 robust,	 static	
capacity	that	helps	us	reconcile	the	insights	of	Wartenberg’s	dynamic	
view	with	the	commonsense	conception	of	power	as	a	robust	capacity	
used	to	prevail	in	conflict.
The	future-oriented	nature	of	power	can	be	usefully	thought	of	as	
a	form	of	credit.	Ascribing	power	to	a	police	officer	involves	expecta-
tions	about	her	future	ability	to	bring	about	certain	consequences.	If	I	
do	not	challenge	her	commands,	they	may	affect	me	(e.g.,	getting	me	
to	comply)	without	her	having	to	“cash	in”	these	expectations.	In	ad-
dition,	my	compliance	can	bolster	her	credit	because	it	communicates	
the	 continuing	 stability	of	her	power	 to	others.	 She	may	be	able	 to	
draw	on	this	credit	in	her	interactions	without	having	to	prove,	in	each	
case,	that	it	is	backed.	When	individuals	do	challenge	her	power,	she	
will	have	to	“cash	in”	and	draw	on	the	support	of	aligned	agents.	But	
the	more	complex	the	underlying	alignments	are,	the	more	stable	and	
unchallengeable	power	can	appear,	since	individual	challenges	can	be	
diffused	more	 easily.	 Despite	 its	 future-oriented,	 dynamic	 character,	
power	can	thus	appear	as	quite	robust.	Nonetheless,	having	credit	re-
lies	on	the	continuing	dispositions	of	others	to	defer	repayment.	Simi-
larly,	the	continuous	reproduction	of	power	requires	that	individuals	
regularly	defer,	acting	as	if	power	were	robust	rather	than	testing	its	
strength.	As	such,	 it	 is	never	simply	present;	 rather,	 it	essentially	 in-
volves	 a	 projection	of	 stability	 into	 the	 future.	 Power	 is	 not	 a	 static	
feature,	and	yet	it	always	depends	on	fictional	expectations	about	its	
continuing	stability	and	robustness.
8. Conclusion
In	this	paper,	I	developed	a	pretense	account	of	power,	arguing	that	
power	 ascriptions	 involve	fictional	 expectations	oriented	 toward	an	
open	 future.	 Social	 interactions	 are	 premised	 upon	 an	 ontology	 of	
power	as	a	robust	capacity,	even	though	social	reality	can	never	fully	
live	up	to	it.	Acting	on	this	premise	helps	to	reproduce	the	social	rela-
tions	on	which	power	 is	based.	Power	 is	never	 simply	grounded	 in	
expectations	 is	not	 to	assess	 their	 truth	or	 justification	but	rather	 to	
focus	on	 their	 articulating	 effect.	This	 effect	distinguishes	power	 as-
criptions	from	ordinary	capacity	ascriptions	to	material	objects,	even	
though	superficially	they	may	appear	to	be	very	similar.	When	I	make	
justified	claims	about	 the	capacities	of	a	 toaster	oven,	based	on	my	
knowledge	 of	 its	 internal	mechanism	or	 its	 past	 performance,	 such	
claims	can	turn	out	to	be	false	(maybe	the	oven	is	not	working	because	
of	a	short	circuit).	But	this	does	not	mean	that	the	claim	involves	fic-
tional	expectations.	The	oven	has	a	determinate	internal	structure	in	
virtue	of	which	it	does	or	does	not	have	its	capacity,	and	this	structure	
is	not	affected	by	my	claims	about	 it.	 In	contrast,	power	ascriptions	
are	vindicated	only	in	a	future	that	is	yet	to	be	shaped.	Whether	the	
officer	will	be	successful	in	imposing	particular	social	consequences	
on	me	depends	on	the	continuous	reproduction	of	her	relationships	
with	other	agents.	
In	contrast	to	an	oven’s	internal	structure,	a	social	alignment	is	not	
like	a	machine	waiting	to	be	turned	on	to	crank	out	an	effect.	Nor	is	
it	—	to	 use	 a	 different	metaphor	 commonly	 used	 for	 power	—	like	 a	
material	resource	that	is	ready	to	be	picked	up	and	put	to	use.	Social	
alignments	are	never	simply	present; they	exist	only	 insofar	as	 they	
are	continuously	reconstituted	by	the	ongoing	activities	of	the	aligned	
agents	and	in	light	of	what	other	agents	might	do	in	the	future		—		this	
is	the	central	insight	of	Wartenberg’s	dynamic	view	of	power	(1990,	pp.	
163–81).	It	is	not	an	epistemic	point	about	the	difficulties	of	predicting	
future	action;	it	is	an	ontological	point	about	power’s	way	of	being.	In	
other	words,	uncertainty	about	the	future	of	social	relationships	is	not	
an	 epistemic	 limitation	of	 our	 ability	 to	 ascribe	 power	 but	 the	 very	
point	of	making	power	ascriptions.	To	act	meaningfully	in	a	complex	
social	world	with	an	open	future,	I	have	to	assume	that	there	are	rela-
tively	stable	structures	that	make	the	effects	of	my	actions	and	those	
of	others	predictable.	It	is	no	accident	that	we	often	think	of	power	as	
a	static	 feature	—	for	example,	 in	analogy	to	physical	strength,	mech-
anisms,	or	material	 resources.	But	while	 these	are,	 strictly	 speaking,	
misrepresentations,	they	have	constitutive	effects.	It	is	this	insight	into	
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on	the	expectation	that	there	are	relatively	stable	structures	that	make	
the	effects	of	my	actions	and	those	of	others	predictable.
The	 reproduction	 of	 power	 requires	 ongoing	 social	 support	 and	
legitimation.	It	makes	sense	then	that	we	can	learn	something	about	
the	ontology	of	power	 from	power-legitimizing	myths.	 In	particular,	
we	learn	that	representations	of	power	often	play	constitutive	roles	in	
reproducing	power.	Social	and	political	theorists	who	are	interested	in	
power	need	to	pay	more	attention	to	the	performative	force	of	images	
and	conceptions	of	power.	Doing	so	will	help	us	make	sense	of	some	
of	the	deep	disagreements	about	the	nature	of	power.	They	may	not	
be	signs	of	epistemic	failure	but	instead	a	reflection	of	the	fact	that	the	
constitution	of	power	involves	fictional	expectations.42 
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